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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ' 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 





STATElHENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellant was charged with grand larceny occur-
ring in Utah County, Utah, January 27, 1969. 
DISPOSITION IN LU\,VER COURT 
The matter \Vas tried by jury before the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, Judge of the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict, on l\<lay 12, 1969. The case was submitted to the 
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jury, which returned a verdict of guilty of the crime 
of grand larceny. The court denied defendant's Motion 
for New Trial and sentenced the defendant to the Utah 
State Prison for the indeterminate term provided by 
law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the conviction and the 
judgment thereon and for an order dismissing the case 
or granting him a new trial. · 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 27, 1969, the Gene Evans Pharmacy, 
Provo, Utah, was burglarized, with watches, cash and 
others items being taken. Their value is in excess of 
$50.00. 
Twenty-three days later, on February 19, 1969, 
N. W. Hayward, a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, 
applied in the Salt Lake County District Court for a 
warrant authorizing him to search the home of de-
fendant at 1082 South 6th West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
for the property stolen in the pharmacy burglary. The 
warrant issued, search made, property seized from the 
def endanf s home, and returned to the issuing magis-
trate, Stewart Hanson. (R 32A, 32B). Two days later 
the defendant was charged in this case in Utah County. 
(R 4). 
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At the preliminary hearing the search warrant 
and its fruits were not used. Defendant was bound over 
to trial on the testimony of Gene Evans, owner of the 
pharmacy, that there had been a burglary and larceny, 
and the testimony of Max W eenig that he had been in 
the Utah County Jail while the defendant was await-
ing bond, and that the defendant had told him he had 
committed the subject crime. (R 3). 
Before trial of the case, defendant made a Motion 
to Suppress Evidence. (R 10-16, 28-30). This 
was denied without consideration of its merits because 
the search warrant and affidavit, not having been placed 
in evidence at the preliminary hearing, and the State 
being unwilling to concede at the Motion to Suppress 
Evidence Hearing that it intended to use them, the 
court had no warrant nor affidavit before it to rule upon. 
(Tr. P6, Ll7-30). 
At the trial, before the opening statements, de-
fense counsel asked the district attorney if he would 
use the subject search warrant and affidavit and the 
fruits of the search. The district attorney said yes, and 
then introduced Officer Hayward's affidavit and Judge 
Hanson's warrant. Defense counsel consented to this for 
the purpose of identifying the documents preparatory 
to a Motion to Suppress. The Motion was then made 
and denied by the court. During these proceedings the 
jury was not present. (Tr. P4, L2-Pl6, L9). 
Gene Evans testified for the prosecution that he 
was owner o fthe Evans Pharmacy in Utah County, 
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that it had been burglarized on January 27, 1969, that 
certain items including paper money stapled together, 
silver coins in money wrappers and Timex watches had 
been taken. He identified Exhibit 3, a money wrapper, as 
possibly having come from his store. (Tr. PIS, L25-Tr. 
P22, L2). He identified 10 twenty-dollar bills, which 
had perforations that might be staple marks, as being 
similar to bills he had had in the pharmacy that were 
taken in the burglary. He also identified mass-produced 
Timex watches, Exhibit 6, as being the same kind taken 
from him in the burglary. (Tr. P26, L3-Tr. P27, L27}. 
Evelyn Morgan Austill was called by the prosecu-
tion and testified that she had been a clerk at the phar-
macy at the time of the burglary. She identified the 
coin wrappers as bearing her handwriting and the money 
and watches as being similar to those carried at the 
pharmacy. (Tr. P34, L5-P35, L5; Tr. 32, L2-9). 
Officer Hayward testified for the prosecution. He 
said that he was a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff, 
that he obtained a search warrant, based on his affi-
davit, from the Third District Court, that he searched 
the defendant's home on February 19, 1969, in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and that the items identified pre-
viously by Mr. Evans and Mrs. Austill were items he 
had found in his search of defendant's home. (Hay-
ward Tr. Pll, L24-P17, LIO). Officer Hayward 
testified that he asked the defendant if he had anything 
to say about the items at his home and that the defend-
ant replied that he had nothing to say. (Hayward Tr. 
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Pl9, L3-21). Officer Hayward further testified that 
to his knowledge, defendant, defendant's wife and their 
children all resided together at that same home. (Hay-
ward Tr. P20, L9-ll). 
The search warrant issued based on the statement 
in Officer Hayward's deposition and affidavit in support 
of the application for warrant that an informant had 
made a buy of property identified as being stolen from 
the Evans Pharmacy from the defendant, and that 
this buy had been made at the request of Dave Rey-
nolds, of the State Department of Business Regulation. 
(R 32A, second sheet). On cross examination Officer 
Hayward admitted that he didn't know whether the 
informant had made the purchase before or after the 
informant had talked to Mr. Reynolds. (Hayward Tr. 
P7, L28-P8, L6). He also testified that he hadn't seen 
the item himself and didn't personally know how it 
connected to the burglary, although Mr. Reynolds had 
advised him that there was a connection. (Hayward Tr. 
P9, Ll2-16; P9, L22-Pl0, L8). 
At the conclusion of Officer Hayward's testimony, 
defense counsel moved the court suppress the evidence 
obtained pursuant to the search warrant because Officer 
Hayward's testimony showed a new, and vital, defect 
in the affidavit. If the "buy" was not made under law 
officer direction and control, then the circumstances 
under which the "buy" was made, or the reliability of 
the informant, became crucial to the existence of prob-
able cause. This motion was denied and the case con-
tinued. (Hayward Tr. PIO, Ll5-Pll, LI3). 
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Max W eenig testified for the prosecution. He had 
been an inmate of the Utah County Jail during the 
few days that defendant was there between his arrest 
and his posting bail. He testified that defendant told 
him several times in detail how he had committed the 
subject burglary and larceny. (Tr. P37, LIO-P39, 
L24). 
On cross examination l\'Ir. Weenig admitted that 
he was serving a one-year term in the Utah County 
Jail as a result of a felony probation violation ('Veenig 
Tr. P2, Ll5-P5, L2) and testified that he was giving 
information not as a result of promises or threats on 
the part of any law enforcement officer. He testified 
that he himself volunteered to "pump" the defendant 
without being asked to do so. (Weenig Tr. Pl2, Ll4-
28). \Vhen defense counsel sought to examine him as 
to an ulterior motive for falsifying the court flatly dis-
allowed the line of questioning. (Weenig Tr. P22, 
L2-19). 
The defendant did not take the stand and called 
no witnesses in his behalf. 
The prosecution introduced no physical evidence 
such as fingerprints, clothing or eyewitnesses to con-
nect the defendant to the crime. The State's case rests 
entirely on possession 24 days later plus admissions to 




CIAL ERROR HY REFUSING TO ALLOW 
EXAMINATION OF WEENIG AS TO 
HIS MOTIVES .FOR TESTIFYING. 
No issue of police force or promises was involved 
because Weenig volunteered to to "pump" the de-
fendant. ( \Veenig Tr. PI2, LI4-28). The issue was 
not external, such as threats or promises, but internal, 
his hope of gain. 
Mr. W eenig was not an ordinary, uneducated 
criminal; he was a former businessman. In fact, he had 
run his own business in the same building where the 
EYans Pharmacy was located and knew the premises 
intimately. (Weenig Tr. Pl4, Ll2-Pl5, LI). Mr. 
\V eenig was serving a one-year Utah County Jail sen-
tence for probation violation starting in December 
1968, and with 10 months still to go, when Mr. Smelser 
was also at the jail. (Weenig Tr. P2, LI6-P3, L25). 
Mr. 'Veenig knew the premises of the Evans Phar-
macy. The story of the means and route of the burg-
lary had been in the Provo newspapers and, of course, 
talked about within the jail. It is entirely possible that 
his testimony was based on this knowledge, without 
defendant ever having talked to Mr. 'Veenig about 
the matter. He did err, for example, on an important 
point that might have been only within the knowledge 
of the actual burglar: Mr. '"" eenig testified that the 
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defendant told him the bulk of the loot was in $20.00 
bills and the total cash taken was $7,800.00, not $5,-
700.00, as alleged in the complaint. (Weenig Tr. P5, 
Ll0-18). In fact, the bulk of the loot was forty $100.00 
bills and the total was $5,700.00. (Tr. 21, L25-28). 
Why did Mr. W eenig volunteer to "pump" the 
defendant? From defense counsel's experience, he has 
been advised that "squealers" are not entirely safe 
among their fellow inmates. It is also possible that a 
"squealer" might gain favor by being an informant 
on his fellow inmates. Mr. W eenig might have hoped 
to save 10 months in jail by giving information against 
the defendant. If that were the case, whether he actu-
ally got information from the defendant, or only said 
that he had in a plausible fashion, either way he could 
have a genuine hope of gain. The court flatly refused 
to allow examination of Mr. W eenig on this point: 
"Q Now you say you saw the Deputy Sheriff, 
Mack Holley, and said you thought you could pump 
information out of Smelser on this burglary, right? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Have you been in the habit of reporting to the 
authorities on what prisoners tell you? 
MR. GAMMON: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q. (By Mr. King) You had a reason for doing 
-for talking to Mack Holley, didn't you? 
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MR. GAJ.VIJ.VION: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. King) Did you hope to gam some-
thing by telling the authorities-
MR. GAMMON: Objection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. You are arguing to 
the jury now, Mr. King. This isn't the time yet for that. 
There will be a time for that, but not now, with this 
witness." 
(Weenig Tr. P22, L2-19). 
The court misconstrued the thrust of the questions. 
Because there was no claim that the witness was acting 
under coercion or promises, the court apparently felt 
that concluded inquiry into his motives for testifying. 
However, there was another equally pertinent area 
going directly to the credibility of the witness, as stated 
in Jones on Evidence, 5th Edition, Vol. 4, Sec. 916, 
P. 1717, "The rule is well settled that, on cross exami-
nation, questions which tend to impeach the impartiality 
of the witness, while not directly relevant to the issue 
on trial, are relevant in the sense that the persuasive 
quality is affected by the discrediting testimony." Jones 
continues on to draw the line of judicial discretion not 
as to the right to cross examine as to motive, but only 
as to the extent of the cross-examination, "Frequently, 
it has been held to be error not to permit 
nation as to the state of feelings or bias of the witness. 
But a question as to the extent of such cross-exami · 
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nation is to be resolved in view of the discretion of the 
court." (ibid P. 1722) . The flat error of the trial court 
was in refusing to allow any cross-examination as to 
self-interest on the part of the witness. Mr. \Veenig 
was not a cumulative witness. There was no connection 
between the defendant and the crime of larceny as 
opposed to possible possession, other than the testimony 
of Mr. W eenig, so he was a vital witness. 
78-24-1UCA1953, provides "who may be witnesses 
-jury to judge credibility .... Neither parties nor other 
persons who have an interest in the event of an action 
or proceeding are excluded; . . . although, in every 
case the credibility of the witness may be drawn in ques-
tion, by the manner in which he testifies, by the charac-
ter of his testimony, or by evidence affecting his char-
acter for truth, honesty, or integrity, or by his motives, 
or by contradictory evidence; and the jury are the ex-
clusive judges of this credibility." 
"The interest of a witness in any particular case 
in which he becomes a witness may always be shown, 
and the effect, if any, of such interest upon the weight 
of the testimony, is always a question for the jury. 
State v. Cerar, 60 U 208, 220, 207 P. 597. 
The error of the court in not allowing cross-exami-
nation as to motive was prejudicial error, because the 
credibility of the witness was crucial, and a proper 
examination into his motives might well have effected 
the outcome of the case. Stat.e v. Neal, 1 U 2d 122, 
262 P. 2d 756, 759; State v. Cluff, 48 U 102, 158 P. 
701; J eMen v. Utah Ry. Co., 72 U 366, 270 P. 349. 
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POINT 2 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 
7 CONSTITUTED A COMMENT ON THE EVI-
DENCE, CONSTITUTING PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY STATING " ... HAVING REA-
SONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THAT 
HIS POSSESSION WAS HONESTLY AC-
QUIRED, HE REFUES OR FAILS TO DO SO, 
SUCH CONDUCT IS A CIRCUMSTANCE 
THAT TENDS TO SHOW HIS GUILT." 
"76-38-1. De:frnition.-Larceny is the felonious 
stealing, taking, carrying, leading or driving away the 
personal property of another. Possession of property 
recently stolen, when the person in possession fails to 
make a satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence of guilt." 
Instruction no. 7. "The mere possession of stolen 
property, howsoever soon after the taking, unexplained 
by the person having possession is not sufficient to 
justify conviction. It is, however, a circumstance to be 
considered in connection with other evidence in deter-
mining the question of innocence or guilt. If you should 
find from the evidence that the property involved in 
this case was stolen, and that thereafter the defendant 
was found in possession or claimed to be the owner of 
the stolen property, such a fact would be a circumstance 
tending in some degree to show guilt, although not suf-
ficient, standing alone and unsupported by other evi-
dence, to warrant finding him guilty. In addition to 
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proof of possession of such property there must be 
proof of corroborating circumstances tending, of them-
selves, to establish guilt. Such corroborating circum-
.stances may consist of the acts, conduct, falsehood, if 
any, or other declaration, if any, of the defendant or 
any other proved circumstance tending to show the 
guilt of the accused. 
One who is found in the possession of stolen prop-
erty is bound to explain such possession in order to 
remove the effect of that fact as a circumstance, to be 
considered with all other evidence, point.ing to his guilt, 
and if he gives a false account of how he acquired that 
possession or, having reasonable opportunity to show 
that his possession was honestly acquired, he refuses 
or fails to do so, such conduct is a circumstance that 
tends to show his guilt." (Emphasis added) (R. 22). 
The purpose of the underlined section of the statute 
is to allow the court to determine as a matter of law 
if the state has made a prima facie case. If the state has, 
the case goes to the jury. If the state has not, the case 
does not go to the jury. However, an instruction, thrice 
repeated, constituting a comment on the evidence by 
the court, that unexplained recent possession "is a cir-
cumstance that tends to show his guilt," goes beyond 
statutory authority. It is error to instruct the jury on 
the question of what constitutes a prima facie case. 
State v. Crowder, 114 U 202, 197 P. 2d 917. "This 
statute is addressed only to the court, it determines 
for the court what evidence is sufficient to constitute 
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a prima facie case, and it is the duty of the court when 
a prima facie case has been made to submit it to the 
jury, but it does not require the court to instruct the 
jury that such facts constitute a prima facie case. The 
jury is not concerned with that problem, they are only 
concerned with whether all of the evidence is suff i-
ciently convincing of defendant's guilt. This court has 
repeatedly held that it is error to instruct the jury on 
that question." 
Here the court's instruction states unequivocally 
"such a fact to be a circumstance tending in some de-
gree to show guilt," "such conduct is a circumstance 
that tends to show his guilt," and, the defendant "is 
bound to explain such possession in order to remove the 
effect of that fact as a circumstance, to be considered 
with all other evidence, pointing to his guilt." These 
are comments on the evidence. These do carry to the 
jury the prima facie case that is reserved to the court 
as a matter of law. The only other evidence, other than 
possession, connecting the defendant to the crime was 
not eyewitness, nor physical, such as fingerprints, but 
only the highly questionable testimony of Max W eenig. 
In State v. Crowder, supra, while the court affirmed 
the conviction, it went on to say "were the evidence 
of guilt susceptible to considerable doubt, it is not at 
all certain that the giving of such an instruction would 
not be prejudical." 
As another issue within this point, recent case hold-
ings have made it clear that a defendant is not required 
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to give evidence against himself at any stage of any 
criminal proceeding, either before or after his arrest. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L 
Ed 2d 694. The statute in question states that a person 
who "fails to make a satisfactory explanation shall be 
deemed prima facie." The statute does not say that no 
explanation is an unsatisfactory explanation. In this 
case, the defendant made no explanation. (Hayward 
Tr. Pl9, L5-21). To hold that no explanation is 
an unsatisfactory explanation is to require self-incrimi-
nation. If a defendant voluntarily gives a statement, 
and the statement is false, the statute would apply. 
No Utah case deals specifically with a "no explanation" 
case under the present statute. State v. Hart, 10 U 
204, 37 P. 331, was a decision before the present statute 
was enacted. Nevertheless, it bears on point, holding 
that the state needs ( 1) recent possession and ( 2) an 
unsatisfactory explanation. State v. Hart, has been 
cited with approval in Utah cases since enactment of 
the statute in its present form, such as State v. Nichols, 
106 U 104, 145 P.2d 802. In this case we have four 
factors: First, the defendant shared possession of his 
home with his wife and children. Second, he was found 
in possession twenty-four days later. Third, he gave 
no false or inconsistent explanation as required by Hart, 
supra. Fourth, there was no other corroborating evi-
dence except W eenig. 
It was error for the court to instruct the jury three 
times as to the inference of guilt. Whether the error 
was prejudicial, from the Utah rulings seems to depend 
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on the circumstances of the case. With the existing cir-
cumstances and factors, such error is prejudicial in 
nature, because without such an instruction, the jury 
might have well reached a different verdict, and this 
is a basic test of prejudicial error. State v. Cluff, supra; 
Jensen v. Utah Ry. Co., supra. 
POINT 3 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE 
S E A R C H OF DEFENDANT'S HOME 
SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUPPRESSED BE-
CAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT ON WHICH THE 
SEARCH WARRANT WAS ISSUED WAS IN-
ADEQUATE TO STATE PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Evidence obtained in a search should be suppressed 
if the search warrant issued upon an affidavit inade-
quate to state probable cause. State v. Jasso, 21 U 2d 
24, 439 P.2d 844. 
It is conceded at the outset that the affidavit need 
not be finely technical, it can incorporate reliable here-
say and observations of others than the affiant, but it 
must state fact. No case sets this forth better than a 
1939 Utah case, Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 U 471, 93 P.2d 
920. In that case, the court was called upon to decide 
squarely a definition of probable cause because it was 
faced with a statute under which a search warrant 
issued, but the requirements of the statute were slightly 
less than the requirements of the Utah Constitution. 
15 
{95-2-10 Utah Laws 1933, as opposed to Article I, 
Sec. 14, Utah Constitution). The court stated, 97 Utah 
at 481, "The whole case upon which a search warrant 
issues must be made by him who prays for such writ. 
The judicial officer before whom an application for a 
search warrant is filed must exercise his judicial power 
to determine whether or not the warrant shall issue· 
) 
such judicial function can be moved only by the facts 
brought before him, which are under oath or affirma-
tion. A warrant to search and seize, which follows upon 
a statement based solely upon the belief of the affiant, 
rests upon the reasoning of the affiant, based upon the 
secret facts of which he may have knowledge, and the 
conclusions which result from such reasoning are affi-
ant's not those of the judical officer. The judicial pro-
cess to ascertain probable cause is then transferred 
from the judicial officer to the affiant. The Constitution 
permits no such thing." 
Applying the rule that the affidavit must state 
facts and migistrate draw the conclusions, the affidavit 
in the case now before the court states "your affiant is 
now and has been for the past 15 years assigned to the 
Detective Detail thereof. 
"On the date of February 19, 1969, at approxi-
mately 9 :00 a.m., your affiant (received information 
from) Dave Reynolds, who received the information 
from a confidential informant that items on the attached 
list are in the possession of Robert Smelser at the afore-
mentioned address. Dave Reyonlds, Dept .of Business 
16 
Regulation, through the confidential informant did 
make a buy from Smelser and has identified the 
as coming from a burglary of Gene Evans Pharmacy 
at Provo, Utah." (R 32A, sheet 2, list of property at 
R 32A sheet 4). 
The particular defects of the affidavit are that it 
alleges that defendant has certain property in his pos-
session with a list attached to the affidavit describing 
the property. However, the affidavit in no way states 
that the property on the is stolen property, nor 
describes the "item" purchased, nor relates it to the list 
of property. It simply states that defendant has pos-
session to wit: "Dave Reynolds, who received the infor-
mation from a confidential informant that items on 
the attached list are in the possession of Robert Smelser 
at the aforementioned address." 
Based on the foregoing, any conclusion that the 
property in the possession of the defendant is in any 
way related to stolen property is entirely the conclu-
sion of the aff iant based on facts which he does not 
relate in the affidavit. 
The affidavit further complicates matters by alleg-
ing that the defendant sold stolen property. It in no 
way identifies what the property was, nor how it was 
identified as being connected with the burglary of the 
Gene Evans Pharmacy. These facts again are left to 
the knowledge of the affiant, and are not submitted to 
the court, to wit: "Dave Reynolds, Department of Busi-
ness Regulations, through the confidential informant 
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did make buy from Smelser and has identified the same 
as coming from a burglary of Gene Evans Pharmacy, 
at Provo, Utah." 
The affidavit leaves these questions unanswered: 
( 1) If the defendant has possession of the property 
itemized on the list, what facts are there in the affidavit 
to connect the property to a burglary? ( 2) If Dave 
Reynolds caused something to be bought from the de-
fendant, what was bought? ( 3) If Dave Reynolds 
caused something to be bought from the defendant, 
what proof is there that it was stolen other than his 
conclusion? 
Reliability of the informant is not of importance 
based on the face of this affidavit because it says the 
informant acted under police control and direction, 
even though the affiant officer relied on information 
given him by another officer. A similar case is U.S. v. 
Ventresca, 380 US 102, 85 S Ct 7 41, 13 L Ed 2d 684. 
There, a search warrant issued for a search of a premises 
where illegal distilling was suspected based on a fac-
tually detailed affidavit of an officer that he and other 
officers had observed the premises, had seen sugar bags 
going in, five gallon cans coming out, smelled mash 
and heard sounds of machinery. The case held that 
hearsay is acceptable, even though not technically evi-
dentiary if it incorporated the reports of other officers. 
It applied the test of reliability of information, not 
evidentiary perfection. It stated "a recital of some of 
the underlying circumstances is essential if the magis-
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trate is to perform a detached function and not serve 
merely as a rubber stamp for the police." Applying 
the Yentresca rationale, however, the questions of 
identity of the items is utterly unrevealed in the affi-
davit. This is crucial to a search warrant issued, as this 
one, under 77-54-2 (I) UCA 1953, on possession of 
stolen property. The property itself is crucial, yet the 
facts by which the property is identified are unknown. 
POINT 4 
THE EYIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT 
TO THE SEARCH WARRANT SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE 
'V ARRANT ITSELF WAS ISSUED 'VITH-
OUT PROBABLE CAUSE, BECAUSE THE 
AFFIANT DIDN'T KNOW AT ALL WHETH-
ER HIS AFFIDAVIT WAS TRUE ORF ALSE 
ON A VITAL POINT. 
The point here is the accuracy of the affidavit, 
not its face value. The facts are: In his affidavit for 
issuance of the search warrant (R 32A, sheet 2) Deputy 
Hayward swore that an informant acting under law 
officer direction and control bought stolen property 
from defendant, as follows: "Dave Reynolds, Depart-
ment of Business Regulation, through the confidential 
informant did make a buy from Smelser ... " At no 
stage of this case has the informant, nor Dave Rey-
nolds, made any appearance. The State chose to support 
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the facts alleged in the affidavit solely on the basis of 
Officer Hayward's testimony at the trial. 
At the trial, Officer Hayward was called as a wit-
ness by the state to identify the property in evidence 
as property he seized at def endanf s home pursant to 
the warrant. (Hayward Tr. P4, Ll7-27). At that 
point, the trial proceedings were interrupted by de-
fense counsel, who was allowed to voir dire the witness 
in regard to the warrant. This would not be timely 
under ordinary procedures, but was necessary in this 
case because the affidavit, warrant, and return on 
warrant were all in Salt Lake County, ( R. 32A, 32B). 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence made prior 
to the trial had been denied because the State refused 
to admit it would use the subject warrant and evidence 
obtained thereby, so that the trial court had nothing to 
act upon, (Hayward Tr. P6, Ll-16). The trial court 
allowed the mid-trial examination and Motion to Sup-
press on this basis. (Hayward Tr. P6, Ll-16). 
Officer Hayward then testified on voir dire, 
"Q Did Officer Reynolds tell you he, himself, had 
made the purchase? 
A He said the informant had made the purchase 
for him. 
Q Was that at his request? 
A I would imagine it was sir, I don't know. 
THE COURT: You don't know? 
A No, sir. 
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Q (By Mr. King) Do you know whether or not 
the informant made the purchase before Officer Rey-
nolds asked him to do so? 
A I don't understand the question. 
Q Did the informant make the purchase before 
or after he talked to Officer Reynolds? 
A I don't know that. 
Q You don't know? 
A No, sir. 
Q. Was it the informant who identified the item 
as being part of the property stolen from the Evans 
Pharmacy? 
A Mr. Reynolds was the one that identified it 
through the list of stolen items he had been furnished 
by Provo City. That was my understanding on it, Mr. 
King." 
(Hayward Tr. P7, L20-P8, LII). 
"Q Did you ever see the item that the informant 
obtained? 
A No, sir. That is still in the possession of Officer 
Reynolds. 
Q So you don't know of your own knowledge how 
it connected to the Evans burglary? 
A No, sir." 
(Hayward Tr. P9, Ll2-18). 
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The effect of this testimony is that Officer Hay. 
ward's affidavit stating that "Dave Reynolds did make 
a buy through the confidential informant," is false. Offi. 
cer Hayward didn't know if this is what happened 
or if the informant made the purported buy on his ow11 
and then reported it after the purported act was done . 
. No statement of fact can actually be supported beyond 
the hypothetical following affidavit which is all that 
Officer Hayward could really have sworn to, "An 
informant, unknown to me, alleged to another officer 
that he bought an item from the defendant which was 
stolen from the Evans Pharmacy. I don't know what 
the item i,s, nor how it connected to the burglary, but 
I am told by Officer Reynolds that it corresponds to 
the property named on the list of property stolen from 
the pharmacy. I don't know who prepared the list, or 
whether the list is accurate, or whether the subject 
item is unique and identifiable, or a mass-produced 
item not traceable specifically to the pharmacy. How-
ever, on the report of this unknown informant, the 
defendant may have possession of the stolen property 
and I would like to make a search." 
This would have been an honest affidavit. It is 
submitted, as argument, that if an officer could obtain 
a warrant without probable cause by distortion of what 
he knows, and the warrant stand up and the evidence 
go in, then the constitutional guarantees of sanctity 
of the home would be nullified and officers encouraged 
to falsify. 
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There are actually two separate issues that must 
be considered. First, because the warrant actually rests 
simply on the report of an informant, is his credibility 
adequately established? Second, once the search war-
rant has been issued by a magistrate, is the affidavit 
itself subject to factual attack? 
As to the first is.sue, the case is clear. Returning 
to Allen V. Lindbeck, supra, probable cause means 
that the magistrate must have enough facts at his 
disposal to make an intelligent determination that a 
search warrant is proper. How can such a warrant 
issue when the source of the information is unknown 
and uncorroborated? The affidavit of Officer Hayward 
doesn't even refer to the information as "reliable" or 
"credible", but only as "confidential." (R 32A, sheet 
2) . There is a plenitude of cases dealing with the credi-
bility of the informant, when this is the key to whether 
cause is probable. Spinelli v. U.S., 21 L Ed 2d 637, 
dealing with a fact situation where the affidavit was 
based part on observations of police and part, but cru"." 
cially, on reliability of informant, sets forth a two-part 
test that ( 1) the affidavit must set forth sufficient 
underlying circumstances necessary for the magistrate 
to make an independent judgment, and (2) must give 
factual detail on why an informant is reliable and more 
than the allegation that the informant is reliable or 
credible is necessary. Such would be only a conclusion. 
Supporting cases are U.S. v. Ventresca, supra; Rugen-
dorf v. U.S., 376 US 528, 11 L Ed 2d 887, 84 S Ct 
825; Draper v. U.S., 358 US 307, 3 L Ed 2d 327, 79 
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S Ct 329; Aquilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 12 L Ed 
2d 723, 84 S Ct 1509. 
As to the second point, once the affidavit has issued 
is it subject to attack as to its accuracy? Regendorf 
v. U.S., supra, states "The court has never passed 
directly on the extent to which a court may permit such 
examination when a search warrant is valid on its face 
and when the allegations of the underlying affidavit 
establish probable cause." The court then goes on to 
allow the attack, although denying the claim, because 
the factual inaccuracies of the affidavit weren't ma-
terial. 
Following the Regendorf decision, several cases 
have touched on the point. The most detailed discussion 
is contained in U.S. v. Halsey, 257 FS 1004, SDNY, 
1966. The problem is administrative--creating a trial 
within a trial and opening the way for delaying tactics. 
The court held, 257 FS 1005, "viewing the problem 
in the broad sense of defendant's submission, we reject 
'the contention. This is not to say that there may never 
be occasions for trying out the truth of an affidavit on 
which a search warrant issues. It is only to say that 
there is no justification for allowing such a de novo 
trial of the issuing magistrate's determination as a 
routine stipulation in every case. Until or unless the 
defendant has at least made some initial showing of 
some potential infirmity he proposes to demonstrate, 
the magistrate's acceptance of the affidavit as truthful 
should be enough." U.S. v. Halsey has been affirmed 
in U.S. v. Bowling, 351 F 2d 241; U.S. v. Suarez, 380 
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.F 2d 715 ("It may be that testimony at trial could 
so clearly demolish a .statement in an affidavit support-
ing a warrant, that a prior denial of a motion to sup-
press would be overruled."); U.S. v. Gillette, 383 F 2d 
843, 848 ("We by no means forestall the possibility that, 
in the appropriate circumstances, a hearing should be 
held to establish the veracity of sworn allegations in 
an affidavit which is sufficient on its face.") 
Defendant accepts the rationale of these cases. 
Attack on the accuracy of an affidavit for search war-
rant can create major problems. However, for the courts 
to turn their back when it is known that the affidavit 
is false is to deny the necessary for truth in sworn 
affidavits to magistrates. 
In this case, Officer Hayward swore a "buy" had 
been made under police control, when he had no knowl-
edge at all that this was the fact. Police observations, 
and action taken under police control, usually are prima 
facie probable cause. However, the acts of unknown 
informants do not constitute probable cause. For them 
there must be support; here there was no support. De-
fendant's procedure could have been no more timely 
than it was. The evidence should be suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL KING 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Robert Joseph Smelser, 
Defendant-Appellant 
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